Research
I am currently thinking about Carnapian explication: a method of conceptual engineering whereby a new concept (the explicatum) is designed to replace an old concept (the explicandum), typically for the purposes of theoretical inquiry. As Carnap characterised the method, an acceptable explicatum should satisfy four requirements:
I am puzzled, for example, by the following: on the one hand, Carnapian explication is typically treated as if it is domain general – that is, as if it can be deployed in any field of theoretical inquiry; but, on the other hand, theorists working in different domains who deploy the method of explication typically begin by offering a domain specific account of fruitfulness.
However, domain specific accounts of fruitfulness are not enough. Without a domain general account, there would be a problematic sense that ‘anything goes’: a theorist who wanted to replace a concept x with a concept y could simply reverse engineer a specific account of fruitfulness for the particular domain of x and use it to justify the explication. To avoid this possibility, we need a domain general account of fruitfulness to put external constraints on any local application of the method of explication.
At present, then, I am in the process of developing a domain general account of fruitfulness and, more broadly, a domain general method of explication. This work is part of a larger project to promote the method of explication as a robust, well-developed and unobjectionable tool at the theorist's disposal.
I am currently thinking about Carnapian explication: a method of conceptual engineering whereby a new concept (the explicatum) is designed to replace an old concept (the explicandum), typically for the purposes of theoretical inquiry. As Carnap characterised the method, an acceptable explicatum should satisfy four requirements:
- an explicatum should be similar in relevant ways to the explicandum.
- an explicatum should be stated precisely.
- an explicatum should be fruitful.
- an explicatum should be simple.
I am puzzled, for example, by the following: on the one hand, Carnapian explication is typically treated as if it is domain general – that is, as if it can be deployed in any field of theoretical inquiry; but, on the other hand, theorists working in different domains who deploy the method of explication typically begin by offering a domain specific account of fruitfulness.
However, domain specific accounts of fruitfulness are not enough. Without a domain general account, there would be a problematic sense that ‘anything goes’: a theorist who wanted to replace a concept x with a concept y could simply reverse engineer a specific account of fruitfulness for the particular domain of x and use it to justify the explication. To avoid this possibility, we need a domain general account of fruitfulness to put external constraints on any local application of the method of explication.
At present, then, I am in the process of developing a domain general account of fruitfulness and, more broadly, a domain general method of explication. This work is part of a larger project to promote the method of explication as a robust, well-developed and unobjectionable tool at the theorist's disposal.
